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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the interrelationship between changes in the provincial minimum 
wage, firms’ export behavior, and firms' performance in Indonesia. In this regard, we 
apply two-stage least squares regression analysis to detailed firm-level data of 
manufacturing enterprises between 2002 and 2014. We find that an increase in the 
minimum wage is associated with decreases in a firm’s employment rate, its probability 
of exporting, and its overall performance in terms of productivity and markup. We also 
use the 2012 minimum wage reform in Indonesia to conduct a combined propensity score 
matching and difference-in-difference analysis to mitigate the potential endogeneity of 
minimum wage regulation. Our findings are generally robust to alternative estimation 
methods. Moreover, the findings suggest that Indonesian exports and the country's 
comparative advantage in international markets are not negligibly affected by higher 
labor costs through minimum wage growth. 
 
 
Key words: minimum wage, firm performance, Indonesia, difference-in-difference. 
 
JEL classification: F14, F16, L25, J88. 
 
 
                                                   
 Corresponding author. 
1 Faculty of Business Administration, Toyo University. 5-28-20 Hakusan, Bunkyo-ku, 
Tokyo 112-8606 Japan. Tel: +81-3-3945-7166. Email: jiadaniel@hotmail.com. 
2 School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University. Email: kyosuke@mte.biglobe.ne.jp. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Because of political instability and poor economic management by President Soeharto 
during 1945–1965, Indonesia’s domestic production and economic development has 
stagnated. In 1970, one-third of the population lived under the world poverty line (World 
Bank Indicator). Faced with such deprived conditions, the government decided to 
introduce the first “Five-year Development Plan," known as Repelita 1, which took effect 
in 1969. It also made a number of crucial economic reforms during the 1970s and 1980s, 
including the relaxation of regulations on international trade, foreign investment, capital 
balances, and banking. In the early 1970s, the government also introduced minimum 
wage legislation, which was designed to increase citizens' social welfare and reduce 
income inequality. Nonetheless, how effective is this legislation in practice? Empirical 
verification is surprisingly rare. In the literature, Del Carpio et al. (2012) find that 
minimum wage regulation negatively affected firms’ employment rates, thereby 
providing evidence of the direct impact of governmental intervention. However, during 
the process of implementing a minimum wage policy, firms’ performance may also be 
affected. For example, a rise in the minimum wage causes an increase in the cost of labor, 
which in turn causes a firm to adjust its resource allocation to other inputs. This situation 
may have an indirect impact on the firm’s productivity. A similar argument can be made 
regarding the impacts on a firm’s markup, sales, and other aspects. Thus, a thorough 
evaluation of the impact of the minimum wage regulation in Indonesia is necessary to 
form a better understanding of whether the government’s goal has been reached as 
expected. 
The current study applies Indonesian census data for manufacturing, gathered by the 
National Statistical Office (BPS) and covering 2002–2014, to disentangle the 
interrelationship between provincial minimum wage regulation, firms’ exporting status, 
and firms' overall performance. After applying various methods of verification, we find 
that an increase in the minimum wage leads to decreases in a firm’s employment rate, its 
probability of exporting, its productivity, and its markup. Further, to mitigate the possible 
estimation bias that arises because of the endogenous nature of the minimum wage policy, 
we use the 2012 minimum wage reform to conduct a difference-in-difference (DID) 
analysis. In particular, we match firms that have experienced larger minimum wage 
increases with those that have experienced lower increases. Our results are robust: the 
impact of minimum wage regulation is generally negative. 
The contributions of this study are threefold. First, to the best of our knowledge, few 
microeconometric studies have attempted to evaluate minimum wage regulation in 
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Indonesia; thus, we aim to enrich such studies. Second, our study helps to fill the gap in 
empirical analysis that explores the relationship between minimum wage regulation and 
firms’ markups (productivity). Last, we apply a unique identification strategy by using 
the 2012 minimum wage reform in Indonesia and estimating the pure impact of this 
governmental policy in a more rigorous manner. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction of Indonesia’s economic background and 
its minimum wage policy. Section 3 summarizes the relevant literature. Section 4 
introduces the data and methodology, and section 5 presents the results. Section 6 
describes the additional robustness checks, while section 7 offers our conclusions. 
     
2. Indonesia's economic background and minimum wage regulation 
 
The general situation in Indonesia 
Indonesia is the world’s fourth largest country with a population of 258 million at the 
end of 2015. Further, according to the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, 
it is the largest economy in Southeast Asia and ranks as the 16th largest in terms of 
nominal gross domestic product (GDP) as of 2016 (World Development Indicators). 
Despite its relatively stable and ongoing economic growth 1  compared with other 
Southeast Asian countries in recent years, Indonesia is still classified as a low ranking 
middle-income country, with a nominal GDP per capita of US$3300 in 2016 (World 
Development Indicators).  
However, the workforce in Indonesia is becoming increasingly educated, although the 
literacy level is still low compared with the levels in neighboring countries. In 2016, the 
average net secondary school enrollment rate in Indonesia was 66%, while the rates in 
Thailand were 82% for females and 75% for males (World Bank 2017). In the 
manufacturing sector, the majority of workers have, at most, senior high school degrees 
(Indonesian Industrial Survey). The large proportion of low-skilled workers has led to a 
low-income level on average, as shown in Figure 1 (currently USD 1 = IDR 13,442). This 
finding is consistent with the wage skill premium, as indicated by Amiti and Cameron 
(2012).2  
 
The development of minimum wage regulation 
In order to improve the welfare of Indonesian workers so that they have an adequate 
                                                   
1 According to the annual GDP growth indicator of the World Bank, the growth rate has 
remained above 5% for more than a decade since 2004 (except for 2009).  
2 They showed that workers with low skills in Indonesia are usually paid less than their 
counterparts with high skills. Moreover, wages increase with educational level. 
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living standard, the government decided to enhance minimum wage regulation. The 
introduction of regulation can be traced back to as early as 1956, followed by a national 
wage council, established in 1969, and minimum wage legislation in the early 1970s. 
However, the minimum wage did not play a decisive role in bringing extra benefits to 
citizens in the early years because regulation was not enforced. It was not until 1989, 
when the government implemented new legislation, that Indonesian society began to pay 
attention. The legislation stated that minimum wages should be based on minimum 
physical needs, the local cost of living, and labor market conditions (Rama 2001). In 2000, 
according to the Indonesian Jobs Report (2010), the Minister of Manpower issued a 
decision (no. 226/2000) that gave governors, mayors, and the heads of districts the power 
to set minimum wage levels. In other words, minimum wage setting was decentralized 
from the national to provincial level and was based on recommendations from local and 
provincial wage councils. Following this, the provincial governors would announce the 
final rates.  
Figure 1 shows the average monthly minimum wage and actual wage in nominal terms 
for 2001–2014. Since 2001, both indices steadily increase and experience only a short 
stagnation at the beginning of the international crisis in 2007/2008; however, this 
stagnation is barely visible in the figure. 
 
Figure 1 Average monthly minimum wage and salaried wage (in IDR) 
 
Source: Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS), Jakarta. 
 
On November 22, 2012, another minimum wage reform occurred. Joko "Jokowi" 
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Widodo, Jakarta’s new governor, announced a significant 44% increase in the nominal 
minimum wage for the capital city(Manning 2012). This increase was later endorsed by 
the government. The new rate reached IDR 2.22 million per month (approximately 
US$230) the following year. Meanwhile, the industrial districts in the surrounding 
provinces such as the Greater Bandung and Surabaya regions, Medan, and Batam 
responded and promised to raise their own minimum wages by similar or even greater 
percentages. However, not all the neighboring provinces of Jakarta raised their minimum 
wages substantially. As can be seen from Figure 2, the distribution of minimum wage 
growth is dispersed. Strong resistance from employer groups was considered the main 
obstacle to implementing the reform. Nevertheless, the extremely large increase in the 
regulated nominal minimum wage during 2012–13 provides an opportunity to undertake 
a quasi-experimental test to investigate the way in which firms’ behavior changed before 
and after the increase. The methodology section describes how we conducted such a test.   
 
Figure 2 Minimum wage reform in 2012 (growth percentages from 2012 to 2013) 
 
 
 
The export trend in Indonesia 
Indonesia’s high rate of economic growth has been driven by its export-oriented policy. 
However, the situation is changing. As can be seen in Figure 3, Indonesian exports 
increase in value until 2011 (except for a fall during the 2008–2009 economic crisis). The 
 Top 10 ranked provinces    the other provinces 
 10-20
th
 ranked provinces 
Source: Minimum wage data from BPS, Indonesia 
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value of exports then falls. There are many reasons that can cause such a change. To some 
extent, it has been triggered by a reduction in Indonesia's economic growth.3 Other 
factors such as protectionist policies toward international trade, the weakening of the 
Indonesian Rupiah against other currencies, the reduction of exports because of China’s 
cooling economy, and declining global commodity prices can also play critical roles. 
Nevertheless, few studies have attempted to investigate the export mechanism from the 
firms' perspective. Given that the decision about the 2012 minimum wage reform in 
Indonesia was made at the end of 2011 and the total export value started to fall during the 
same period, we cannot help but ask: Does firms’ decision-making about exports have 
anything to do with minimum wage regulation, after we control for all the macro 
determinants of exporting? This question provides our motivation to investigate further. 
 
Figure 3 Export value index for Indonesia 
 
Source: World Bank Indicator. 
 
3. Literature review 
 
The current study is associated with several aspects of scholarly literature. The first is the 
relationship between minimum wage regulation and employment. Theoretically, if 
existing wages are set much below the workers’ marginal product of labor (MPL), as in 
the case of a monopolistic firm, a moderate increase in minimum wages can benefit 
workers without leading to job losses because the firm still profits by hiring workers 
                                                   
3 According to the World Bank, the economic growth rate in Indonesia fell to 4.7% in 
2015. 
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(Rebitzer and Taylor 1995). However, in the case of a competitive labor market, a 
minimum wage increase leads to less employment.  
Another aspect of literature related to the current study is the theoretical work that 
considers minimum wages and international trade. Earlier studies can be traced back to 
Brecher (1974a, 1974b), who uses a model with two goods, two input factors, wage 
distortion, and constant return-to-scale technologies. The author shows that a rise in the 
minimum wage in labor-intensive countries leads to an increase in input, which decreases 
the export of products. Neary (1985) finds similar results after including more input 
factors.  
The analysis of minimum wage regulation also extends to another series of theoretical 
verifications that emphasize the relationship between firm heterogeneity and trade (Melitz 
2003, Bernard et al. 2007). Melitz (2003) shows that when entry into export markets is 
costly, only firms with greater productivity choose to serve the export market, while the 
most productive firms choose foreign direct investment (FDI). The increasing demand for 
labor among incumbents and new entrants with greater productivity drives up the average 
wage, thereby forcing less productive firms to exit the market. Bernard et al. (2007) build 
on Melitz's framework but incorporate another factor: the difference in the intensity of 
inputs across sectors. Their findings show that exporters in an industry with a comparative 
advantage may refrain from exporting when exposed to costly trading expenses. Thus, a 
firm’s productivity, the demand for labor associated with minimum wage changes, and 
decision-making about exports are interrelated; however, the correlation is inconclusive, 
thereby leaving an empirical problem that must be solved.  
In terms of empirical studies, quite a few investigate the impact of minimum wage 
regulation. Nguyen (2010) explores this impact on employment in Vietnam, while 
Neumark and Wascher (2008) study the US. Others, such as Maloney and Nunez (2004) 
regarding Columbia, Ginding and Terrell (2007) regarding Costa Rica, and Ma et al. 
(2012) and Huang et al. (2014) regarding China, all find a negative correlation between 
minimum wage regulation and employment. A recent study by Gan et al. (2016) analyzes 
the effect of the minimum wage on Chinese firms’ exports and presents a further negative 
conclusion.  
Numerous studies also focus on Indonesia. Alatas and Cameron (2008) use household 
labor market panel data to investigate the relationship between minimum wages and 
employment, while Rama (2001) applies 1993 labor force survey data. Both studies reach 
the conclusion that the impact of the minimum wage varies depending on a firm's size; 
moreover, the influence is negative for small firms. Del Carpio et al.'s (2012) study is the 
closest to our own in terms of the data source. They find that the impact of minimum 
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wages on employment is negative among small-scale firms. Javorcik and Poelhekke 
(2014) show how FDI promotes a firm's performance, while Takii and Ramstetter (2005) 
find that FDI can also increase a firm’s labor productivity. Nevertheless, no empirical 
studies have tried to explore the interrelationship between minimum wage regulation, a 
firm’s exporting decisions, and the firm's performance. Thus, the current study aims to 
fill this gap by comprehensively evaluating Indonesian governmental policy from various 
perspectives.  
  
4. Data and estimation strategy 
 
Data set 
This study's main data set was taken from the Survei Manufaktur, the Indonesian 
Census of Manufacturing, conducted by the BPS, covering 2002–2014. The census 
surveys all registered manufacturing firms with more than 20 employees and captures a 
wide set of plant-level characteristics, which we used to study the nature of plant-level 
heterogeneity. The characteristics include output, capital stock (fixed capital), the number 
of employees, the value of intermediate material (both domestic and imported), sales 
volume, the total wage bill (for production and non-production workers), ownership, and 
participation in international trade. We removed observations with negative sales, output, 
and all types of input to avoid misreporting the information. The final number of 
observations after cleaning is 259,283, of which approximately 8.8% belong to foreign-
owned firms.  
The BPS also provided data on the industry-level wholesale price index (WPI), which 
we used to deflate the variables measured in value terms; namely, output, capital, sales, 
total wages, and raw material. With regard to industry codes, the Indonesian government 
changed the coding system in 2010. Because our data set covers the period both before 
and after 2010, we required concordant information to ensure the consistency of the 
measurement. Thus, we used a two-digit industry code to create a concordance table. This 
table had 27 industries in total. The WPIs were matched to their corresponding industries, 
with a base year of 2000.  
Provincial minimum wage information was also sourced from the BPS. There are 33 
provinces in our data set. The minimum wage data were matched to the plant-level data 
using the codes and years of these provinces. Observations were missing for some years; 
however, we used information from the prior and following years for interpolation.4  
                                                   
4 When a missing observation belongs to the last year of our sample period, we used the 
average growth rate in prior years for interpolation.  
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Methodology 
Our analysis uses firm panel data to estimate four outcome variables of interest: total 
employment, whether or not a firm engages in export activities, a firm’s markup, and total 
factor productivity. In order to model decision-making about drafting the minimum wage 
more effectively and determine the minimum wage’s sole impact on firms’ behavior, we 
use two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis as our baseline estimation strategy, 
as shown in the following equations:  
        𝐿𝑛(𝑚𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑡−1) = 𝛽𝑗𝑍𝑗𝑡−2 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡−1                          (1) 
        𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐿𝑛(𝑚𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑗𝑡−1)
∗ + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑔𝑡            (2) 
 
In the first stage, we regress the log minimum wage in province j at time t-1 on a vector, 
Z, of provincial characteristics in time t-2 that may influence the economic environment 
of that particular province, such as GDP per capita, the unemployment rate, the Gini 
coefficient, the labor participation rate, and minimum living expenses (all in their 
respective logarithmic forms). These factors are considered to indirectly lead to different 
minimum wage levels that have been determined by governmental officials in each 
province. 
In the second stage, as in equation (2), we estimate the minimum wage’s impact on the 
four aforementioned outcome variables, using the fitted value of the dependent variable 
obtained in the first stage. Yijt is the outcome for firm i located in province j at time t. The 
control variables include a vector of firm characteristics, Xit-1, at time t-1, such as the 
capital–labor ratio; the sales volume; the inventory–sales ratio; the total amount of labor 
(except when estimating total employment); the year dummy, gt ; and firm fixed effects. 
εijt is the error term. Because the minimum wage is determined for each province, we 
also cluster the standard error at the provincial level. 
 
Total factor productivity and markup calculation 
Firm-level markup is defined as the ratio of price to marginal cost. However, since 
firms rarely report products' prices, we follow the recent work of De Loecker and 
Warzynski (2012) to establish the firm-level markup. Thus, the production function of 
firm i at time t is as follows: 
𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹𝑖𝑡(𝐿𝑖𝑡, 𝐾𝑖𝑡, 𝑀𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖𝑡)                           (3) 
 
where L, K, and M are the physical input of labor, capital, and intermediate materials 
respectively. ω denotes firm-specific productivity, which we also establish to estimate 
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a firm’s total factor productivity (TFP).   
The estimation of firm-level markup hinges on the optimal choice of input without any 
adjustment cost and estimation of the output elasticity of any input. As indicated by De 
Loecker and Warzynski (2012), since the choices regarding labor and capital are usually 
not exogenously determined, we focus on the optimization of intermediate materials. 
Thus, the optimal choice of input is equal to the optimization problem. In this regard, we 
write the Lagrangian function as: 
𝐿(𝐿𝑖𝑡, 𝐾𝑖𝑡, 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝜆𝑖𝑡) = 𝑤𝑖𝑡𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖𝑡[𝑄𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝐹𝑖𝑡(𝐿𝑖𝑡, 𝐾𝑖𝑡, 𝑀𝑖𝑡, 𝜔𝑖𝑡)]  (4) 
 
where 𝑄𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  is the minimum amount of output that firm i at time t needs to produce in 
order to survive. The first-order condition for intermediate materials then gives the 
following:  
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑀𝑖𝑡
= 𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑚 − 𝜆𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑀𝑖𝑡
= 0                      (5) 
Using algebra, we can rearrange equation (5) to derive markup 𝜇𝑖𝑡 as the ratio of price 
to marginal cost. Thus:  
𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖𝑡
𝑚(𝛼𝑖𝑡
𝑚)−1                         (6) 
where 𝜃𝑖𝑡
𝑚 =
𝜕𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝑖𝑡
𝑄𝑖𝑡
 is the output elasticity of intermediate materials. Dividing this by 
the ratio of the value of intermediate materials and expected output (𝛼𝑖𝑡
𝑚) yields the 
markup. The calculation of 𝜃𝑖𝑡
𝑚 needs a detailed estimation of the production function. 
Following Ackerberg et al. (2006), we adopt the control function approach. Specifically, 
we use a translog specification of the production function as follows:  
𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑙𝑘𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑚𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽𝑙𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑘𝑚𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (7) 
 
After the coefficient vector, ?̅?, is estimated, we can calculate the output elasticity of 
materials 𝜃𝑖𝑡
?̂? as the sum of the coefficients of all material-related terms in equation (7),5 
thus deriving firm-level markup.    
A few points are worth extra attention. In order to estimate equation (7), we need to 
acquire the three inputs, L, K, M, in terms of physical quantity. With regard to L, since the 
information on employment is available, we can measure labor input directly. However, 
K and M are only reported in value terms. We deflated these two variables using the WPI 
                                                   
5 With regard to equation (7), we can use different specifications. Alternatively, we can 
assume that 𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  or 𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡. The markup calculated for each case is then represented as markup_2 and markup_3.  
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for each industry. Despite this practice, the estimation results can still suffer from bias 
due to the omitted firm-specific input prices (De Loecker and Goldberg 2014). In order 
to correct this bias, we follow De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) and model the omitted 
firm-specific input prices as a reduced-form function of output prices, exporter status, and 
all interaction terms between the three inputs and export status. In this way, we construct 
a more flexible control function. 
However, the TFP, ωit, of firm i at time t can also be inverted using the production 
function (see equation (3)). We follow the method proposed by De Loecker and 
Warzynski (2012) who extend Ackerberg et al.'s (2006) study. The TFP estimation 
proceeds as follows. First, for each two-digit International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC), we estimate a translog production function of capital and labor 
(including lags and interactions), allowing for different coefficients by exporter, year, and 
industry. Using exporting status as the state variable, we allow for differences in optimal 
input demand and do not need to make the perfect competition assumption for each sector. 
The estimation yields a measure of the fitted value of output φ and an error term, ε, 
for each plant–year–industry combination. Accordingly, unobservable productivity can 
be determined as 𝜔 = 𝜑 − 𝛽𝑙 − 𝛽𝑘 − 𝛽𝑙2 − 𝛽𝑘2 − 𝛽𝑙𝑘 . In the second step, we 
nonparametrically regress TFP on its lag to determine innovations to TFP, which should 
not be correlated with current capital or labor input. Since labor input at time t is 
correlated with current TFP innovations, all labor-related terms need to be instrumented 
with lagged labor terms (i.e., l by l_lag and l by l2_lag). These moment conditions are 
combined together to estimate the translog production function using the generalized 
method of moments (GMM) approach.  
Apart from the above, in our section regarding robustness checks we also use the Olley 
and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methods of TFP calculation to confirm 
our findings. 
 
The endogeneity issue 
Even though we try to control for the decision-making of minimum wage 
implementation by including provincial characteristics, there is still the possibility that 
unobservable provincial factors (which are correlated with the minimum wage) can also 
affect firms’ exporting behavior and performance. For example, export-oriented 
provinces are more likely to provide export-promoting policies so that firms located in 
these provinces have a greater incentive to increase their exports. Meanwhile, complying 
with minimum wage regulation means that firms' profits are squeezed, which in turn 
reduces the firms' capabilities to export (firms that are more profitable are more likely to 
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export). Since we do not take account of the export-promoting policies adopted by each 
province, ignoring such a factor leads to a downward estimation of the minimum wage’s 
impact on firms’ exporting decisions. The same mechanism also applies to other variables 
of interest. In order to mitigate the estimation bias caused by this kind of endogeneity, we 
discuss three methods to improve our estimations.  
 
1) The combination of propensity score matching (PSM) and difference-in-difference 
(DID) estimation 
We first use a quasi-experimental practice to single out the pure influence of the 
minimum wage. The 2012 minimum wage reform, as mentioned in section 2, provides us 
with a perfect setting to conduct a DID estimation; namely, to compare the change in 
exporting status (or performance) of firms that are more likely to be affected by the reform 
(the treatment group) before and after 2012 with firms that are relatively less sensitive to 
the reform (the control group) during the same period (for a similar strategy, see Lu and 
Yu 2015, Gan et al. 2016). The specification of the DID estimation takes the following 
form: 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2012𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(mwage)𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2012𝑡 ⋅
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑗𝑍𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡           
       (8) 
where ∆𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the performance change from before the minimum wage reform to after 
the reform for firm i located in industry j at time t. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2012𝑡  indicates the post-reform 
period, which takes a value of 1 if it is after 2012 and 0 otherwise. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 is 
a binary indicator to show whether or not firm i is categorized as a treated firm under 
different circumstances. The coefficient of the interaction term, 𝛽3, thus becomes our 
main interest.  
As described in section 2, the distribution of minimum wage growth among provinces 
in Indonesia is quite unbalanced. Contrary to the notion that only the surrounding 
provinces of Jakarta would increase their minimum wages to a greater extent, some 
remote provinces witnessed an even greater growth in their minimum wages after the 
2012 reform. Given the random distribution of minimum wage increases across the 
country, we use real provincial minimum wage growth in 2013 and 2014,6 rather than 
geographical proximity, as the first criteria to decide on the treatment and control groups. 
Specifically, if a province experienced a minimum wage growth rate of more than 50% 
                                                   
6 We use the growth percentages from 2012 to 2013, from 2013 to 2014, the weighted 
average growth of these two years, and combinations of the foregoing to conduct the 
analysis. The results remain unchanged.   
13 
 
for 2013 and 2014 combined, we consider it a treated province;7 otherwise, we consider 
it a control province. Treated firms are defined as those that are located in the treated 
provinces, while the rest are those that belong to the control provinces. Accordingly, the 
identification assumption with the DID estimation specification is that, conditional on a 
set of covariates, { 𝛼𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑍𝑗𝑡−1  , the regressor of interest 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2012𝑡 ⋅
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 should be uncorrelated with the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡: 
E [𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2012𝑡 ⋅ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝛼𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑍𝑗𝑡−1] = E[𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝛼𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑍𝑗𝑡−1]   (9) 
In simple terms, the exporting status or performance of firms located in the treated 
provinces would have experienced the same percentage of change as those located in the 
control provinces had there been no minimum wage reform in 2012.  
However, a concern with DID specification is that the treatment and control groups 
may differ in some aspects that are related to the reform. If so, 𝛽3 in equation (8) 
captures not only the impact of the reform but also the initial heterogeneity between the 
two groups. For example, firms may observe the macroeconomic conditions of each 
province before the 2012 minimum wage reform. They could then make approximate 
predictions of the provincial levels of the minimum wage in the years to come. Such 
predictions will lead to changes in the firms’ production behavior,8 causing “selection 
bias” when we estimate the impact of minimum wage reform on firms’ performance. 
Propensity score matching (PSM) is a widely used non-experimental design to handle this 
type of selection problem. First introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), propensity 
scores are used to “balance” treatment and control groups on a vector of baseline 
characteristics; namely, the scores make the groups as similar as possible with respect to 
these observed characteristics. The propensity score itself is defined as the probability of 
being in the treatment group as a function of the covariates. The covariates of our study 
consist of firm and province characteristics. In the first step, we apply a probit model to 
estimate propensity scores. In the second step, we embed the results into the DID setting 
to determine the pure influence of 2012 minimum wage reform on firms’ behavior.  
 
2) Compliance vs. stickiness 
In the data set, we do not observe whether or not a firm complies with minimum wage 
                                                   
7 This includes nine of 33 provinces in total: Sumatera Selatan, Bengkulu, Kep. Riau, 
DKI Jakarta, Bali, Kalimantan Barat, Kalimantan Timur, Sulawesi Selatan, and 
Gorontalo. 
8 One scenario is that after predicting a large increase in a province’s minimum wage 
after 2012, a firm may reduce its hiring of low-skilled workers to avoid an enlarged labor 
cost.  
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regulation.9 It is difficult to record such information because a firm can provide different 
types of workers with various payrolls. For example, technicians are paid more than their 
colleagues in the production department. Since firms only report the overall value of their 
wage bills and the total number of employees, it is more reasonable to use the average 
wage of a firm as the criteria. We define the category of firms that tend to adjust the 
average wage to meet the minimum wage criteria in the following year as the treatment 
group, or the compliant group. We define those firms that do not make such an adjustment 
as the control group, or the sticky group. Specifically, we compare a firm’s average wage 
with the minimum wage in the prior year and in the current year. If the firm changes its 
average wage from below the minimum wage to above the minimum wage in the second 
year, we count it as a treated firm (in the data set, 95.6% of the observations belong to the 
control group). After controlling for other firm characteristics, we try to verify the 
differences in performance between firms in the treatment and control groups. In a 
different manner to the strategy used in the two foregoing methods, the standard of the 
“treatment” is the status change required for firms to meet minimum wage regulation 
throughout the estimation period, rather than the likelihood of complying with 2012 
reform.   
 
3) Quantile regression 
The third practice is to implement quantile regression, which is a commonly used 
method in the literature (e.g., Gan et al. 2016). As Ma et al. (2012) indicate, local 
minimum wages have heterogeneous impacts on firms with different average wages; 
moreover, a stronger effect is observed on firms with average wages that are relatively 
close to the minimum wage. Hence, the impact of minimum wages on firms’ behavior 
may differ depending on the initial wage level of each firm. 
Consequently, firms that always offer low wages in prior periods should experience a 
much greater shock if they comply with the minimum wage increase after 2012. In 
contrast, firms that provide employees with higher average wages should be more 
immune to the shock and less likely to change their economic behavior. Thus, we expect 
the 2012 minimum wage reform to have a greater effect on firms with relatively lower 
wages where the minimum wage tends to be binding. We accordingly group firms into 
quantiles based on their average wage rates (the total wage bill/total employees): 0–25%, 
25–50%, 50–75%, and 75%–100%. The estimation specification then becomes the 
                                                   
9 According to Del Carpio et al. (2012), compliance with minimum wage law is a critical 
issue in Indonesia. The minimum wage is larger than a firm’s average wage only for a 
small percentage of the whole sample. 
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following:  
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡2012𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛(mwage)𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝐿𝑛(mwage)𝑗𝑡 ⋅
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒1~4𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑗𝑍𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝑔𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡         (10) 
 
where quantile1–4 are all binary indicators that represent the first quantile to the fourth 
quantile. For example, if the average wage of a firm falls into the category of the first 
quantile of overall wage distribution, quantile1 takes a value of 1; otherwise, it takes a 
value of 0. The same rule applies to the other quantile variables. In this instance, we are 
interested in the sign of 𝛽𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 , which captures the heterogeneous impact that the 
minimum wage may have on firms with different average wages.    
 
5. Estimation results  
 
Baseline 
In our baseline estimation using the 2SLS method, all four firm indices (the log of total 
employment, exports, markup, and productivity) are negatively affected by changes in 
the minimum wage. Table 2 reports the results. We regress provincial minimum wages on 
each firm index while controlling for firm and province heterogeneity. The reported 
standard errors are robust and clustered at the provincial level. In columns (3)–(5), we 
report the results using different markup measurements, as described in section 4. We find 
a negative and statistically significant correlation between the provinces' minimum wages 
and all four dependent variables. Specifically, column (1) shows that after controlling for 
firm characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, and time effects, an increase in the 
minimum wage by 10% results in a 23.6% reduction in total employment, which is a 
substantial impact. This effect is consistent with the findings in the literature (Gan et al. 
2016, Del Carpio et al. 2012). Such literature points out that since minimum wages are 
supposed to directly affect the wages of low-income workers and indirectly affect the 
wages of high-income workers, a firm must adjust its hiring scheme. 
(Table 2 here) 
 
Column (2) presents the findings for export status. Here, a negative correlation between 
the minimum wage and a firm’s decision to engage in exporting is confirmed, although 
the correlation is not statistically significant at the 10% level (it becomes significant at 
15%). This result is consistent with the finding in Gan et al. (2016), which indicates that 
a 10% increase in a provincial minimum wage is correlated with a 2.73% drop in the 
probability of exporting. Although we choose a linear probability model in the second 
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stage as our baseline estimation, we find similar results even if we use a logit/probit model 
as an alternative.  
Columns (3)–(6) show the results when we focus on the two major indicators of firm 
performance: markup and productivity. Despite some variation in terms of scale, the 
implementation of minimum wage regulation all points in the same direction as far as 
markup is concerned: a negative and significant correlation is observed. A similar finding 
can be seen for firms' productivity. A possible interpretation is that because a firm 
complies with minimum wage regulation in a certain province, its labor cost increases. 
This increase reduces the price/marginal cost ratio if the firm chooses to maintain the 
stability of its commodity's price to avoid losing customers. In such a case, the markup 
would fall, as predicted by the estimation results. Meanwhile, in accordance with the 
mechanism described in Melitz (2003), if firms that have greater productivity are more 
likely to engage in exporting activities, the opposite is also true. In other words, if a firm 
withdraws from the export market, it probably faces a productivity reduction.    
 
PSM–DID estimation  
Table 3 shows the results when we apply the criteria of whether or not a region has 
experienced a larger minimum wage increase in order to divide the sample of firms. As 
aforementioned, we first use a set of provincial characteristics (ln_gdp_percapita, 
ln_minimumliving_expense, unemploymentrate, labor_participation_rate, and 
gini_index) and firm characteristics (capital_labor_ratio, ln_sales_volume, 
inventory_sales_ratio, and foreign_dummy) in 2011 together with a probit model to 
predict a firm’s probability of being in the treatment group. 
(Table 3 here) 
 
In the second step, for the dependent variable, we calculate the difference for each firm 
performance index between 2011 and 2013.10 We then estimate the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATT) for the outcome variables using the propensity score. In all 
cases, being in a treatment group leads to a decrease in firms’ performance, including 
performance in employment, the probability of exporting, productivity, and markup. In 
other words, after the implementation of the 2012 reform, if a firm that is located in the 
provinces experiences a minimum wage increase of more than 50%, its performance 
index is likely to reduce to a greater extent than that of a firm with similar characteristics 
that is located in similar provinces but which has experienced a minimum wage increase 
                                                   
10 We also considered the difference between 2011 and 2014. The qualitative predictions 
remain the same.  
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of less than 50%. For example, in terms of employment, a treated firm experiences a 
reduction in performance of 0.6% more than a control firm. The findings are consistent 
with those in the baseline estimation; however, we also extend the findings by taking into 
account “selection bias.” In this regard, we find that the negative impact of minimum 
wage regulation is not as large as we have observed in the baseline regression. This result 
implies that “selection” behavior has a downward influence on our predictions.    
 
Quantile regression 
Table 4 shows the results when quantile regression is applied. We interacted the log of 
provincial minimum wage with quantile indicators while controlling for major firm and 
provincial characteristics. All the interaction terms have negatively significant signs in all 
specifications, except for productivity. However, if we combine the coefficients of the 
interaction terms with that of ln_minimum_wage, we find that minimum wage regulation 
has a robustly negative impact on all aspects of firms. Another result is that the absolute 
value of the coefficients for the interaction terms increases with the quantile range. This 
result contrasts with the findings in Gan et al. (2016), where the opposite is observed. A 
possible reason is that although the average wage for firms located in the upper quantile 
is large, the firms' share of low-wage workers is also large. Thus, minimum wage 
regulation has had a more substantial influence on these firms than on firms with average 
wages categorized in the lower quantile. 
(Table 4 here) 
 
Compliance vs. stickiness 
The results using the criteria of compliance with minimum wage regulation are 
presented in Table 5. These results present a clearer picture of how to evaluate a minimum 
wage policy. wage_adjusted_dummy takes a value of 1 if a firm’s average wage was 
below the minimum wage in the prior year but adjusted its average wage to meet the 
minimum wage standard in the following year. 11  The interaction term 
ln_minimumwage*adjusted_dummy then captures the difference between the impact that 
the minimum wage has on the performance of compliant firms and that of non-compliant 
firms. 
(Table 5 here) 
 
                                                   
11 The assumption that we make here is that if a firm’s average wage is above the level 
of the provincial minimum wage, the firm is more likely to be one that complies with 
minimum wage regulation. However, we are aware that in reality, firms with low average 
wages may also comply with minimum wage regulation.    
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The results show that ln_minimumwage*adjusted_dummy has a negative and 
significant impact on all the performance indices of a firm. Further, ln_minimum_wage 
has its expected signs. This finding supports our conclusion that from a firm’s perspective, 
compliance with local minimum wage regulation has a negative influence, although 
compliance may bring benefits from the employees’ perspective. Thus, minimum wage 
regulation proves to be a double-bladed sword; hence, further welfare analysis is needed 
for a thorough evaluation. 
 
6. Robustness check 
 
Firms’ entry and exit 
If we are to follow the logic described in Melitz (2003), we assume that when a firm 
complies with minimum wage regulation, it must increase its competitiveness to survive. 
In this regard, the survival rate is expected to affect the firm’s performance because 
productive firms are more likely to succeed than their competitors, thereby forcing the 
latter from the market. Thus, we create an entry and exit dummy to control for a firm’s 
entry into, and exit from, markets. Apart from the first year recorded in our data (2002), 
if firm i does not exist in the prior year but has an observation during the current year t, 
entry_dummy at time t takes a value of 1. Similarly, if the current year is the last year of 
firm i's existence (except for 2014), exit_dummy at time t takes a value of 1. In all 
specifications, including these two alternative terms, our predictions do not change.12  
 
Timing of the 2012 minimum wage reform 
As outlined in section 2, the significant jump in the regulated nominal minimum wage 
during 2012–2013 proved to be an ideal environment in which to conduct a quasi-
experimental test because firms were less likely to perceive this change before the 
announcement. The decision about the 2012 minimum wage reform adopted a top-down 
approach; thus, individual firms had little influence over the rate of the minimum wage 
in each province. However, considering the large percentage of state-owned firms in 
Indonesia, one could still argue that the 2012 reform was predictable, at least by those 
firms with strong governmental connections (presumably large firms). These firms could 
adjust their behavior before the minimum wage reform took effect in 2012. Consequently, 
we first use firm size, measured by sales volume, to control for this factor that could 
potentially contaminate our estimation of minimum wage regulation’s pure effect. Second, 
we include an additional term in the DID regression, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 ⋅one year before 
                                                   
12 We do not report the results here; however, they are available on request.  
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the 2012 reformt, to check whether firms changed their behavior when expecting the 
reform. These robustness checks do not change our qualitative findings.   
 
Alternative DID strategy 
As a further robustness check, we use foreign/domestic ownership as a criterion to 
divide the treatment and control groups, while taking account of the shock of the 2012 
minimum wage reform. We also conduct PSM for the compliance standard used in section 
4. By doing so, we make those firms that comply with minimum wage regulation 
comparable with those that do not comply in all respects, except for the status of 
compliance. In this way, the pure impact of minimum wage regulation can be determined. 
All these checks validate our prior findings.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This study uses data of Indonesian manufacturing firms supplied by the BPS. We apply 
this data to investigate the interrelationship between provincial minimum wage regulation, 
firms’ exporting status, and firms' overall performance. In addition to a 2SLS estimation, 
we use the Indonesian 2012 minimum wage reform to conduct a DID analysis together 
with PSM. We find a consistent result that an increase in the minimum wage causes 
decreases in a firm’s employment rate, its probability of exporting, its productivity, and 
its markup. Robustness checks confirm our findings.   
In sum, the results suggest that Indonesian firms’ exports, comparative advantage, and 
performance in international markets are to some extent negatively affected by higher 
labor costs because of minimum wage regulation. However, several caveats are worth 
mentioning. First, it is important to note that minimum wages may not only alter local 
labor conditions but also reflect changes in other factors that may drive firms’ export 
behavior. For example, reductions in the probability of exporting may be driven by 
changes in the structure of human capital and physical capital investment, and changes in 
the supply-chain process that affect the composition of exports. Moreover, all the 
variations in decision-making about exports are associated with firms’ heterogeneity 
(performance). The exploration of these factors is beyond the scope of the current study 
and can be considered by future research.   
Second, since the minimum wage legally applies to all workers/laborers, it is assumed 
that small- and medium-sized firms are those that are mostly affected because of their 
relatively lower average wage level. Given that these firms account for a substantial share 
of the total workers in Indonesia, further analysis of small- and medium-sized firms is 
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crucial for a more complete evaluation of the labor market effects of minimum wage 
regulation.  
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Table 1 Summary statistics 
variable N mean sd min max definition unit 
Firm 
characteristics 
       
Y 259277 3.30E+07 2.83E+08 0.2727025 4.13E+10 The value of all 
goods produced  
1000 
Rp 
L 259277 193.5304 733.0872 20 56139 Total number of 
workers 
perso
n 
K 258599 2.49E+08 1.93E+10 0.2645503 6.62E+12 All fixed capital 
based on 
current value 
1000 
Rp 
SA 259277 3.50E+07 2.88E+08 1 4.13E+10 Total revenue 1000 
Rp 
W 259277 2028935 1.49E+07 105.3846 4.35E+09 Total wage for 
both production 
and other 
workers 
1000 
Rp 
M 259277 1.74E+07 1.46E+08 0.3072197 1.89E+10 The value of 
total raw 
material 
1000 
Rp 
E 259277 732200.2 1.50E+07 0.2340276 3.93E+09 The quantity of 
electricity 
purchased 
KwH 
INV 259277 1.18E+07 7.75E+08 0.2572678 3.04E+11 The value of the 
inventory at the 
end of the year 
1000 
Rp 
ex 175802 0.1836782 0.3872227 0 1 Export status  
KL_ratio 258599 886701 6.21E+07 0.0000178 2.37E+10 Capital/labor 
ratio 
 
inventory_ratio 259277 238200.9 4.50E+07 3.88E-11 1.99E+10 Value of 
inventory/value 
of all goods 
produced 
 
minimum_wage 259140 677.3283 323.3333 237.027 2441.301 Provincial 
minimum wage 
Rp 
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foreign_dummy 259278 0.0878748 0.2831133 0 1 Dummy 
variable to 
show whether a 
firm has foreign 
capital 
 
markup_1 238415 11.05138 25.84633 7.94E-07 496.5185 Firm's markup 
(method 1) 
 
markup_2 238415 9.812031 21.76704 1.15E-06 241.8129 Firm's markup 
(method 1) 
 
markup_3 238415 18.24 40.46367 2.14E-06 449.5162 Firm's markup 
(method 1) 
 
productivity 238415 7.381699 2.854154 -12.94269 15.59557 Firm's total 
factor 
productivity 
 
average_wage 259277 7680.644 28301.56 4.112688 1.20E+07 Total wage/total 
number of 
workers 
 
Province 
characterisics 
       
unemployment_rat
e 
259158 8.810833 3.409894 0 18.9 The 
unemployment 
rate of the 
province 
 
ln_gdpperca 259154 8.968838 0.5372053 7.547502 10.82281 Log of GDP per 
capita of the 
province 
 
ln_minimum_living
_expense 
202097 13.56286 0.3299477 12.73442 14.64836 Log of the 
minimum living 
expenses of the 
province 
 
labor_participation
_rate 
259158 0.6680254 0.0383993 0 0.8099 labor 
participation 
rate of the 
province 
 
gini_coefficient 222790 0.3530329 0.037477 0.24 0.46 Gini coefficient 
of the province 
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Table 2 Baseline: 2SLS estimation results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES log of total 
labor 
export 
status 
markup_1 markup_2 markup_3 productivity 
ln_minimum_wage_lag1 -0.236*** -0.0273 -2.872* -3.271** -6.081** -0.204** 
 (0.0369) (0.0251) (1.670) (1.385) (2.575) (0.0832) 
capital_labor_ratio_lag1 -1.30e-10** 0 8.57e-09 6.04e-09 1.12e-08 -1.08e-10 
 (6.17e-11) (0) (7.15e-09) (5.30e-09) (9.86e-09) (1.41e-10) 
ln_sales_volume_lag1 0.418*** 0.00856*** 5.716*** 4.889*** 9.089*** 0.885*** 
 (0.00331) (0.00172) (0.393) (0.332) (0.616) (0.0154) 
inventory_sales_ratio_lag1 2.71e-09** -7.79e-10 3.63e-08** 3.32e-08** 6.17e-08** -1.94e-09 
 (1.17e-09) (8.07e-10) (1.78e-08) (1.60e-08) (2.97e-08) (2.04e-09) 
ln_total_labor_lag1  0.106*** -2.589*** -4.229*** -7.862*** -1.066*** 
  (0.00278) (0.282) (0.228) (0.424) (0.0249) 
foreign_dummy_lag1 0.212*** 0.298*** -1.101* -1.006** -1.871** -0.0616* 
 (0.0173) (0.0110) (0.593) (0.506) (0.940) (0.0341) 
Observations 178,596 120,508 178,596 178,596 178,596 178,596 
R-squared 0.575 0.170 0.150 0.122 0.122 0.185 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. In the first stage, the second period lag of unemployment_rate, 
ln_gdp_percapita ln_minimum_living_expense, labor_participation_rate, and gini_index are used to 
instrument ln_minimum_wage_lag1. Year dummy is included. Standard errors are clustered at 
provincial level.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3 PSM in DID estimations: the results for minimum wages in terms of high- and low-growth 
regions 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference 
d_ln_total_labor Unmatched -0.044027534 -0.01783444 -0.026193094 
 ATT -0.044027534 -0.037785897 -0.006241637 
d_export_status Unmatched -0.023663453 -0.002564103 -0.021099351 
 ATT -0.023663453 0.69675723 -0.720420684 
d_markup_1 Unmatched -6.76034846 -10.9023419 4.14199347 
 ATT -6.76034846 -5.05403041 -1.70631806 
d_markup_2 Unmatched -7.7392264 -12.0613488 4.32212237 
 ATT -7.7392264 -3.68379817 -4.05542822 
d_markup_3 Unmatched -14.3867721 -22.4213467 8.03457457 
 ATT -14.3867721 -6.84796643 -7.53880566 
d_productivity Unmatched 0.017419401 0.129317865 -0.111898465 
 ATT 0.017419401 0.435570388 -0.418150988 
We use firm and provincial characteristics in year 2011 to calculate propensity score in the first stage. 
Single nearest-neighbor matching is applied.  
 
 
Table 4 The results using quantile regression (based on average wages)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES log of total 
labor 
export 
status 
markup_1 markup_2 markup_3 productivity 
capital_labor_ratio_lag1 0 0 3.69e-09 2.99e-09 5.56e-09 -7.15e-11 
 (0) (0) (2.95e-09) (2.24e-09) (4.16e-09) (7.25e-11) 
ln_sales_volume_lag1 0.118*** 0.00376*** 2.488*** 2.176*** 4.045*** 0.231*** 
 (0.0129) (0.00120) (0.200) (0.181) (0.337) (0.0192) 
inventory_sales_ratio_lag1 1.25e-10 -0 4.88e-08 4.98e-08 9.26e-08 -7.74e-09 
 (7.12e-10) (4.66e-10) (4.41e-08) (3.97e-08) (7.38e-08) (5.07e-09) 
ln_total_labor_lag1  0.0194*** -0.509* -1.589*** -2.954*** -0.316*** 
  (0.00273) (0.293) (0.297) (0.552) (0.0319) 
foreign_dummy_lag1 0.0317*** 0.00107 0.850 0.343 0.637 -0.0323 
 (0.0110) (0.0103) (0.635) (0.469) (0.872) (0.0416) 
ln_minimum_wage_lag1 -0.0374 -0.517 0.817 0.740 1.376 -0.229 
 (0.0404) (0.329) (3.105) (3.342) (6.212) (0.158) 
ln_minimumwage*quantile1  -0.0285     
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  (0.0193)     
ln_minimumwage*quantile2 -0.00299*** -0.0283 -1.438*** -1.450*** -2.696*** 0.0612*** 
 (0.000586) (0.0193) (0.319) (0.348) (0.648) (0.00456) 
ln_minimumwage*quantile3 -0.00507*** -0.0273 -1.918*** -1.860*** -3.457*** 0.110*** 
 (0.00100) (0.0193) (0.360) (0.393) (0.731) (0.00680) 
ln_minimumwage*quantile4 -0.00915*** -0.0268 -2.673*** -2.507*** -4.660*** 0.155*** 
 (0.00147) (0.0193) (0.417) (0.451) (0.838) (0.0103) 
unemploymentrate_lag1 -0.00104 -0.000618 0.0217 0.0166 0.0309 -0.00992 
 (0.00342) (0.00131) (0.229) (0.254) (0.472) (0.0120) 
ln_gdppercapita_lag1 0.143 0.191*** 2.934 3.314 6.161 -0.739* 
 (0.128) (0.0507) (6.599) (7.129) (13.25) (0.421) 
ln_minimumliving_expense_lag1 -0.0421 -0.0317*** -1.029 -0.664 -1.234 -0.0160 
 (0.0276) (0.0118) (1.983) (2.153) (4.002) (0.0899) 
laborparticipationrate_lag1 0.0689 -0.0928 -28.97 -27.45 -51.03 -1.168 
 (0.206) (0.113) (26.47) (29.47) (54.77) (0.801) 
gini_index_lag1 -0.138 0.172*** 1.692 3.098 5.760 -0.0884 
 (0.106) (0.0605) (10.41) (10.91) (20.28) (0.503) 
Observations 178,621 120,522 178,621 178,621 178,621 178,621 
R-squared 0.060 0.006 0.080 0.097 0.097 0.057 
Number of psid 31,227 26,155 31,227 31,227 31,227 31,227 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year dummy is included. Standard errors are clustered at 
provincial level. Fixed-effects model is applied.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 The results for wage-adjusted and non-adjusted firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES log of total 
labor 
export 
status 
markup_1 markup_2 markup_3 productivity 
capital_labor_ratio_lag1 0 0 3.91e-09 3.18e-09 5.91e-09 -8.56e-11 
 (0) (0) (3.09e-09) (2.36e-09) (4.38e-09) (7.49e-11) 
ln_sales_volume_lag1 0.117*** 0.00420*** 1.789*** 1.511*** 2.808*** 0.270*** 
 (0.0126) (0.00115) (0.182) (0.167) (0.310) (0.0225) 
inventory_sales_ratio_lag1 1.32e-10 -0 4.83e-08 4.92e-08 9.15e-08 -7.73e-09 
 (7.08e-10) (4.70e-10) (4.25e-08) (3.83e-08) (7.13e-08) (4.98e-09) 
ln_total_labor_lag1  0.0191*** 0.0138 -1.092*** -2.029*** -0.345*** 
  (0.00272) (0.293) (0.306) (0.568) (0.0331) 
foreign_dummy_lag1 0.0319*** 0.000924 0.833 0.322 0.599 -0.0320 
 (0.0109) (0.0103) (0.646) (0.477) (0.887) (0.0428) 
ln_minimum_wage_lag1 -0.0506 -0.0264 -1.773 -1.569 -2.916 -0.0349 
 (0.0404) (0.0194) (3.161) (3.374) (6.272) (0.168) 
wage_adjusted_dummy 0.360** 0.218* 75.49** 82.11** 152.6** 4.575*** 
 (0.177) (0.117) (37.20) (41.58) (77.30) (1.076) 
ln_minimumwage*adjusted_dummy -0.0475* -0.0331* -12.89** -14.01** -26.05** -0.658*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0178) (5.497) (6.150) (11.43) (0.159) 
unemploymentrate_lag1 -0.00162 -0.000502 -0.100 -0.0954 -0.177 -0.00140 
 (0.00349) (0.00131) (0.242) (0.262) (0.487) (0.0118) 
ln_gdppercapita_lag1 0.155 0.188*** 5.105 5.152 9.577 -0.884* 
 (0.132) (0.0508) (6.911) (7.361) (13.68) (0.455) 
ln_minimumliving_expense_lag1 -0.0376 -0.0322*** -0.0483 0.239 0.444 -0.0829 
 (0.0279) (0.0118) (2.046) (2.186) (4.063) (0.0925) 
laborparticipationrate_lag1 0.0961 -0.0940 -25.85 -24.74 -45.98 -1.409* 
 (0.208) (0.114) (28.06) (30.91) (57.45) (0.800) 
gini_index_lag1 -0.148 0.174*** -0.280 1.342 2.494 0.0206 
 (0.108) (0.0607) (10.93) (11.43) (21.24) (0.511) 
Observations 178,621 120,522 178,621 178,621 178,621 178,621 
R-squared 0.058 0.006 0.041 0.057 0.057 0.032 
Number of psid 31,227 26,155 31,227 31,227 31,227 31,227 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Year dummy is included. Standard errors are clustered at 
provincial level. Fixed-effects model is applied.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
